The US presidential electoral system, based on a college of electors, is often the subject of controversy. In particular, the use of the ‘winner-takes-all’ rule is often criticised, as it has the potential to bring to power a president who has not won a majority of the popular vote – something that actually happened in 2016 and 2000. This paper shows that most reform proposals have failed because of the nature of the problem: the states that make up the United States find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma. From a rational perspective, it is in each state’s interest to adopt the ‘winner-takes-all’ rule in order to best reflect the views of its citizens at the federal level. However, the consequence of such a voting system, when adopted by all states, prevents the optimal aggregation of citizens’ preferences at national level, which is not desirable for society as a whole. A weighted proportional representation system, if used by all states, would ensure that the final decision is more representative of the preferences of all citizens. However, as each state has an incentive to unilaterally choose the ‘winner-takes-all’ rule, regardless of the electoral system chosen by the other states, it is impossible for all states to adopt such a rule without a coordination mechanism. Here, we analyse interesting proposals for overcoming this dilemma, such as the inter-state agreement on the national popular vote, and how our model applies to representative democracy.
US presidential elections: how can we resolve the prisoner’s dilemma?
This paper analyses proposals for overcoming the dilemma whereby each state has an interest in unilaterally adopting the ‘winner-takes-all’ rule, even though this is ineffective at the collective level. In particular, it considers solutions such as an inter-state agreement on national popular voting, and examines how this model applies to representative democracy.
Reference IPP Policy Brief No. 60
Presentation
Key Results
- Almost all states have used the ‘winner-takes-all’ rule for the US presidential election since the 1830s. But this system has been criticised for several reasons. One of these is that it can result in the election of a president who does not always secure a majority of the popular vote at federal level (George W. Bush versus Al Gore in 2000; or Donald Trump versus Hillary Clinton in 2016).
- The problem can be partly described using game theory. The Electoral College system is caught in a prisoner’s dilemma: it would be in all states’ interests to cooperate, but none does so because none can be sure that the other states will choose to cooperate.
- A coordination mechanism is needed to escape this dilemma. Some interesting attempts are currently underway, such as the inter-state agreement on the national popular vote.
- A similar dilemma can be found in a representative democracy. Voting discipline in parliaments can lead to distortions in the aggregation of preferences, which can be detrimental to society.
Héloïse Cloléry
